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Technological knowledge and organizational knowledge are distinguished in 
order to define economic competence formally. This definition is made opera­
tional in the simplest possible linear model of production. Productivity gains 
are shown to originate from changes in organizational capabilities that are made 
effective by changes in the assignment of complementary input factors. They 
have no connection with economies of scale or scope. A numerical application 
illustrates the role of internal organization as a source of productivity in the 
operation of unchanged quantities of inputs combined in fixed proportions.
*T am indebted to Louis Phlips for patient supervision. I am thankful to Etienne Billette de Vil- 
lemeur for invaluable discussions and to Rolf Fare and Jean-Benoît Zimmermann for hints, criticisms 





















































































































































































1 IN T R O D U C T IO N
To the economic historian who examines business practices, the performance of firms 
reflects not the outcome of a deterministic technology but rather the degree of success 
of what is commonly referred to as organizational capabilities. In the words of Chandler 
(1992):
”[T]he key concept I use to explain the similarities in the beginnings and growth of 
modern industrial enterprises is that of organizational capabilities. (...) These capabili­
ties were the collective physical facilities and human skills as they were organized within 
the enterprise." (p. 487, added emphasis)
Can organizational capabilities be distinguished from input factors involved in produc­
tion? This is the question that motivates the following investigation. A tautological 
answer is to define organizational capabilities as what constitutes the competence of 
the firm or, in more common words, its ability to transform inputs and sell the resul­
ting outputs profitably. Past contributions to the theory of the firm offered some more 
pervasive answers in models of production. While no brief summary can do justice to 
the richness of the literature that concentrates on the theory of the firm, two main 
streams can be identified that give contrasted answers to the question. The first one 
is commonly referred to as the technological view of the firm. In a very stylized man­
ner, it favours the derivation of formal propositions founded on some explicitly defined 
axiomatic framework. This approach describes production as a "black box” in which 
the organizational capabilities of the firm are merely reflected by the specification of 
the quantities of all the outputs that can be obtained from some given inputs in the 
commodity space. The second stream can be referred to as the organizational view 
of the firm. From a more realistic stance, it opens the "black box” in order to put 
emphasis on the way input factors are used to produce outputs, that is on the internal 
organization of production. In this perspective, the organizational capabilities of the 
firm can be viewed as knowledge about how to exploit the potential services of given 
resources in production.
The objective of this paper is to draw some distinctive features from the two tra­
ditions in order to recast some intuitively appealing insights offered in the latter into a 
standard axiomatic setting of the kind introduced by the former. The analysis proceeds 



























































































knowledge are defined that lead to a formal expression of economic competence. The 
nature of the firm is characterized fis a set of organizational capabilities. In section 3 a 
simple linear model of production is described that encapsulates the concepts defined 
in the previous section. In section 4 some propositions are derived from the linear 
model that shed light on some Penrosian claims on the growth of the firm. These pro­
positions concern the change in the maximum output level that results from a change 
in the quantity of available input factors and/or in the organizational capabilities of 
the firm. In section 5 a numerical application is discussed. Section 6 concludes the 
paper.
Throughout the analysis, the terms capital (or labour) resources, capital (or 
labour) inputs and capital (or labour) factors are used indifferently. The terms worker 
and machine are used for the sake of clarity in examples or illustrations. They do not 
rule out the study of the production of services of any kind despite the connotation of 
manufacturing activities they carry along.
2 T h e N a tu re  o f th e  F irm
This section defines the concepts of technological knowledge and organizational know­
ledge that lead to the formal expression of economic competence.
Consider an hypothetical representative firm that operates in a static production 
economy. It has M  possible existing or potential factors of production serving as inputs 
to be transformed into N  goods or services defined as outputs. Both input and output 
markets are competitive. Throughout the analysis vectors and matrices are denoted by 
bold characters while sets are denoted by capital characters. A technology transforming 
inputs x 6 R+ into outputs y 6 R+ is represented by a production possibility set that 
describes all production plans in the commodity space that are technically feasible 
for the firm. The sets of all subsets in R+ and in R+ are denoted by 2R+ and 2^+ , 
respectively. Following Shephard (1970), the definition of two distinct sets for input 
and output quantities can be derived from the production possibility set. This turns 
out to be convenient a notation for the purposes of the analysis below and authorises 
the standard neo-classical definition of technological knowledge to be formulated as 
follows.
D e f in it io n  1: T ec h n o l o g ic a l  k n o w l e d g e  is described by the input corre­




























































































X  : R+ —* 2r + maps outputs into subsets X(y)  C of inputs. The set X (y)  
is called the input set and it denotes all input vectors x 6 R+ that yield output y £ ;
and
Y  : R+ —► 2r+ maps inputs into subsets Tfx) C R1* of outputs. The set y (x) is 
called the output set and it denotes all output vectors y £ R+ that are obtainable from 
x £ R1*.
Technological knowledge refers to all physically possible transformations of inputs 
x £ R+ into outputs y £ R+ that are constrained by the intrinsic characteristics 
of these inputs and outputs. The definition is in line with the theory of the firm that 
concentrates on the physically embodied form of knowledge as identified with ’’arti­
facts”, that is the physical resources in which technological knowledge is embedded, 
namely capital assets (machines) and labour assets (workers). In more general terms, 
this form of technological knowledge can also be referred to as books of blueprints.
Beyond the intrinsic characteristics of inputs and outputs that impact on the 
productive possibilities of the firm, the technological limits on the actions of the firm 
can be modelled as influenced by the economic environment. This environment may 
be captured by a parameter vector (or matrix) z of real numbers. The environment 
in which production occurs is determined by exogenous parameters, which may be 
variable parameters or constant parameters. The variable parameters may impact on 
the productivity of input factors, and one is interested in how different values of these 
parameters determine different instances of production possibilities. The constant pa­
rameters may also impact on the productivity of input factors, but these parameters 
are considered to be fixed for all instances of production possibilities. Accordingly, they 
are not included among the arguments of z. The values taken by the parameters of z 
put some restrictions on the input and output sets. The economic content captured 
by the parameters in z is depending upon the raison d ’etre of the production model 
under scrutiny.1 In the present analysis, z is meant to capture the source of differences 
in productivity associated with differences in the assignment of complementary input 
factors such as machines and workers for the purpose of producing some good(s) or 
service(s).
*For a series of possible interpretations and an extensive introduction to the general representation 




























































































In order to make clear what is meant by an assignment of complementary input re­
sources, consider the down-to-earth problem faced by production managers that con­
cerns the combination of heterogeneous capital assets with heterogeneous labour assets. 
More eloquently, the problem is one of assigning different types of machines to different 
types of workers. The reduction of the real-world complexity of the huge set of inputs 
to exactly two complementary sets allows the model to capture positive externalities 
in production as induced from the combined use of heterogeneous inputs imposed by 
the technological knowledge, while leaving the analysis tractable. Accordingly, in the 
following capital assets and labour assets will be described by two subsets of inputs, 
making a notational distinction necessary. Define the subsets X k and X i  that parti­
tion the set of all possible existing or potential input factors. Indices fc € { 1 ,..., K} 
and / € {1, . . . ,L }  label qualitatively different types of capita! resources and labour 
resources, respectively, as distinguished with respect to their intrinsic characteristics. 
Observe that K  + L = M. Define also the set X kxL = X u  x X l , that is the set of 
all possible pairs of complementary inputs. In the case of capital inputs, intrinsic cha­
racteristics are physical or functional attributes. In the case of labour inputs, intrinsic 
characteristics are manual or intellectual attributes. These characteristics are assumed 
throughout to be of an objective kind.
Consider the simplest possible situation in which the production of a good is made 
possible by the combination of one unit of capital input (a machine) and one unit of 
labour input (a worker), that is a pair (Xk,xi) 6 X kxL with X* =  xj = 1. Changes 
in the environment summarized by z impose some specifications on the production 
technology. These can relate to the types of inputs or to the types of outputs (or both) 
and also to any other contextual variable. More specifically, the contribution of a given 
(type of) worker or of a given (type of) machine to production may first depend on 
which task is being performed by the same pair (x*,X|). Each input renders a different 
service when combined in the same pair in order to produce qualitatively different 
outputs. Second, the contribution of a given (type of) worker or of a given (type of) 
machine to production may also depend on which pair (ifc,x/) is combined for the 
performance of a given task. Each input renders a different service when contributing 
to the performance of the same task but when assigned in different pairs. Third, other 
production instances may come up from changes in the environment that relate neither 
to input or output characteristics nor to the nature of the task but to features such as 




























































































Concentrating on the latter case, let the same pair (xt,xi)  perform the same task 
in two different environments. If productivity is compared in the two instances, the 
measured outcomes resulting from the performance of a given task by the same (type 
of) worker combined with the same (type of) machine can vary from one environment 
to another. Anything that may result in a negative or positive externality onto the 
productivity of given inputs applies. The elements in the environment at the origin of 
differences in the measured outcomes can be control variables (e.g., reward structures 
or compensation packages) implemented by the administrative entity that defines the 
tasks to be performed and designs the production structure that assigns types of ca­
pital inputs to types of labour inputs. These elements can be traced back neither in 
differences in the types of machine or in the types of worker nor in the nature of the 
task. They are responsible for variations in the marginal contribution to production 
of unchanged inputs participating to an unchanged production structure. Whatever 
the rationale that may be put forward for the explanation of the phenomenon, these 
elements are observed to enhance the productivity of inputs, other things being equal.
In any case, each pair (x\,,xi) involves some embodied technological knowledge 
as defined by subsets of intrinsic characteristics, namely physical facilities (for capital 
assets) and human skills (for labour assets). When the assignment of input factors 
in the performance of an unchanged task remains constant, the embodied dimension 
of technological knowledge that is supported by the combined assets in use remains 
constant also. Accordingly, every variable parameter that impacts on the productivity 
of input factors belongs to a dimension of knowledge that is not embodied in the factors 
of production at work. If the rise in productivity cannot be explained by technological 
changes — i.e., changes in the volumes of capital and labour inputs — it must be 
explained by changes in organizational capabilities — i.e., changes in the ability to use 
given capital and labour resources. Whence the following tentative definition.
D e f in it io n  2: O rg a n iza tio n a l  k n o w l ed g e  is described by the set of pairs 
of capability parameters
Z(y)  =  {zki ■ Zki £ [0,1]} U {ziit : zik € [0,1]},
where k €  { 1 , . . . ,  /V} and l 6  { 1 , . . . ,L } ,  that are attached (i) to each input type 
k e  { 1 , . . . ,A '}  when combined with some input type l €  { 1 , . . . ,L } ,  and (ii) to each 
input type l 6  { 1 , . . . ,L }  when combined with some input type k 6  { 1 , . . . ,A '} ,  respec­



























































































A-(y) 1 . .  l .. L
l Z\\ ~\L
k Zki
K z k i ZKL
F igure  1(a): capab ility  p a ram e te rs  attached to each input type k £ { 1 ,.. . ,  A'} 
when combined with some input type / € { 1 ,.. . .  L) in the productive task (k, l) = (/, k). 
The capability attached to capital input k when combined with labour input / is z ti■




F ig u re  1(b): capab ility  p a ram e te rs  attached to each input type / G { 1 , . .., L) 
when combined with some input type k G {1,. . ., A'} in the productive task (/, k) = (k , /).
The capability attached to labour input / when combined with capital input k is 27*.
The consideration of technological knowledge as given in Definition 1 and of 
organizational knowledge as given in Definition 2 motivates a tentative definition of 
economic competence, as follows.
D e f in it io n  3: E c o n o m ic  c o m p e t e n c e  for the production of some given y  g 
V'(x) is a relation X (y)  such that
X (y )  = {(xk,Zki) : zu = Zki(xk)} U {(n,z/*) : z<* = zik(xi)},
for all ( )  6 X KxL(y), that is the union of the subsets of Xn(y)  x [0.1] an<l 
X L(y) x [0,1] containing the pairs (Xk,Zki) and (x/,zik), respectively.
In other words, economic competence is defined as the union of the graphs of a mapping 
from X x (y )  to [0,1] that is such that xk —* zki and of a mapping from X l(y) to [0,1] 
that is such that x/ —> z;*. The scalars zki and z/k are proxies for embodied knowledge 




























































































of membership of the objective characteristics supported by each member in the pair 
(x/,,xi) to the set X(y) when combined together in the same task. Each input factor 
%k € X x (y )  and x/ G X i(y )  is modelled as used — or exploited — in a given production 
instance to some degrees z;* and zu that describe the range [0, lj in all possible assi­
gnments to a complementary input factor xt G AT(y) and x* G A'/, (y), respectively. In 
substance, economic competence is the observed ability to exploit the intrinsic charac­
teristics supported by input factors identified by the pair (x^,xj) € X/<xL(y) involved 
in the production of some output vector y G V(x). This definition is an attempt to 
give some formal content to the following claim by Penrose (1959) that may be made 
operational in models of production:
’’Strictly speaking, it is never resources themselves that are the ’’inputs” in the 
production process, but only the services that the resources can render. The services 
yielded by resources are a function of the way in which they are used - exactly the same 
resource when used for different purposes or in different ways and in combination with 
different types or amounts of other resources provides a different service or set of services.
(...) [I]t is largely in this distinction that we find the source of the uniqueness of each 
individual firm” (p. 25, original emphasis).
Capability parameters capture differences in the services that can be rendered by gi­
ven resources x G R+ involved in the production of some output y GR+ ■ For clarity, 
the terms in the vector z are obtained as displayed in Table 1 above. The production 
technology of the firm transforming inputs x G R+ into outputs y G R+ are now repre­
sented by the output correspondence V i x. z ) or by the input correspondence X ( y . z ). 
The elements of the capability vector z can take different values in the range bounded 
by the null vector and the unit vector. That is, (0 ,. . . ,  0) < z < (1 ,. . . ,  1). Different 
values for the elements of z yield different output quantities y(z) G Y (x, z) that fall 
between the no production situation 0 G K(x. 0) and the technologically determined 
output situation y G V(x). That is, 0 < y(z) < y.
Differences in capabilities are reflected by a distribution of weights attached to 
each input involved in production. These weights do not refer to differences in the scale 
of inputs but rather to differences in the ability to exploit the technological knowledge 
supported by unchanged resources. Differences in the economic competence for the 
production of some given y G V(x) in some particular activity result in differences 



























































































positive weights z > (0 ,. . . ,  0) result in some positive level of output y(z) > 0. For some 
positive weights z < (1, . . . ,  1) the obtained level of output y(z) < y falls short of the 
technologically determined level of output that would be obtained with z = (1, . . . ,  1). 
This accounts for organizational slack.
Note that changes in the values taken by the capability parameters do not im­
ply any change in the ratios of capital inputs to labour inputs. Simply, capability 
parameters express the idea that the capital-service and the labour-service — rather 
than capital itself and labour itself — are involved in production. The quantities of 
complementary inputs are regarded as technologically determined while the values of 
capability parameters are regarded as organizationally fixed. Only the scaling in units 
of output can vary as a result of differences in organizational capabilities from one 
production instance to another, other things being equal. Accordingly, only some 
distinctive endowments in organizational capabilities characterise differences among 
firms that operate the same quantities of inputs for the production of some perfectly 
substitutable outputs.
The definition of organizational knowledge as a disembodied environmental factor 
that impacts on the productive possibilities of the firm as determined by the embodied 
dimension of knowledge in input factors can be interpreted in the light of the recent 
literature that specializes on the management of productive operations. An example is 
Bohn and Jaikumar (1992) who define technological knowledge as the understanding of 
the effects of the input variables on a process of production. If this process is restricted 
to a task (ifc, /) performed by the pair (x/ti, Xu,) of complementary input factors, the case 
zm zik =  0 describes a state of no understanding (no task is performed) and the case 
zu z>k = 1 describes a state of complete understanding (the embodied knowledge is fully 
exploited in the performance of the task). Capability parameters can be interpreted in 
the same manner as the levels of participation that are attached in behavioural studies 
to the qualities (such as intelligence or patience) describing what psychologists call the 
behavioural profile of individuals when involved in various social environments. The 
representation of these levels of participation in mathematical terms is detailed in Aubin 
(1993, pp. 197-201). In the present analysis, qualities are the intrinsic characteristics 
of input factors x and social environments become instances of various output bundles 
y 6 y(x). This means that technological knowledge sets the upper physical boundaries 
to the productive possibilities offered by the transformation of input factors. And this 



























































































in productivity that are observed among a population of firms operating the same 
quantities of inputs for the production of substituable outputs, an idea that is best 
expressed in Eliasson (1994). The definition of organizational knowledge connects also 
to what Cohen and Levinthal (1994) term an absorptive capacity, namely the ability to 
exploit new technological developments. The reason is simply that the set of capital and 
labour inputs as indexed by k =  1 , . . . ,  A' and / =  1 , .. . ,  L, respectively, were assumed 
above to describe all existing or potential factors of production to serve as inputs. 
Some organizational capabilities may relate to inputs that are not available and even 
unknown to the firm. Accordingly, they capture the ability to exploit new technological 
knowledge embodied by resources that will be made available in a future period only. 
Finally, observe that the definition of economic competence can easily be extended to 
the industry level in a way that borrows from a contribution by Zimmermann (1995). 
To see this, assume that firms in an industry differ only in the organizational capabilities 
that enable them to transform some given quantities with some common technology. 
Then the total economic competence involved in the production of some output y = 
JOj y 1 in the industry is the envelope of the economic competences involved in the 
production of yJ 6 F J(x) by individual firms j  € { 1 ,..., J}. Formally, total economic 
competence is
UjA'-'(y’) = {(i/t.Zfci), (x,,zik) : zki -  sup{z*,} and ztk = sup{z/fc} |,
for all € X kxl(y), which is the union of public economic competence with the
private economic competence. Public economic competence is
rijA’- '(y ')  =  {(xk,z ki),{xi, z,k) : zki =  in f(z^ )  and zik =  inf{z/t }} ,
for all (x/c,xi) € X ^ xi(y) ,  which is the (disembodied) knowledge shared by all firms. 
And private economic competence is simply UjXJ(yJ) \  C\jXJ(y3), which is the (disem­
bodied) knowledge that is not shared by all firms in the industry.
The analysis that follows integrates the definitions above in a linear model of 
production that takes explicit account of the choice of some particular combination of 
complementary factors out of a range of alternatives.
3 A  L inear M od el
The definition of economic competence above presupposes some variable utilisation 




























































































expressed by a production function, which in turn presupposes a physical maximization 
of output from given inputs. However, optimality is by no means a matter of course 
and results from some organizational design of productive activities that connect to 
the down-to-earth manner in which inputs are transformed in workshops and carried 
on the market.
The observed economic competence of a given firm can be modelled as depen­
dent upon the organization of production that happens to be selected from a range 
of alternative assignments of inputs. To do that, in this section the simplest possible 
linear model of production is defined that incorporates explicitly the capability para­
meters attached to the complementary input factors in various assignments. The three 
following assumptions describe the model formally.
ASSUMPTION A. 1: There exists a class of possible activities (or productive
processes) that are completely specified by the quantities of each of the inputs which they 
consume and each of the outputs which they produce when carried on at unit level, such
that
are such that
A' : $3 aL x™m=1 n=l i Vnt
r) € R " , X' = (<*1*1,.. .,a'MxM) 6 .R+ ,y  = (yi, ■ • • ,y/v) 6 R+,
1 € R " and where a' = K,--- ) e R f ,  0' = Æ) e
e L PL >0, m = 1,... , M, (0
Z-*m=1 PL > 0, i = 1,... (n)
e L i < >0, n = 1,... ,N , (iii)
E»=i OfJj > 0, i = 1,... (iv)
The constraint (i ) asserts that each output is producible, (ii) asserts that each activity 
produces at least one output, (iii) asserts that each input is required by at least one ac­
tivity, (in) asserts that each activity uses at least one input. This standard assumption 
asserts that an activity converts certain commodities into certain other commodities in 
technologically determined ratios between outputs and inputs. The class of activities 
describes all particular methods of production that constitute technological knowledge 
as given in Definition 1. In general, production may be thought of as the joint opera­
tion of several activities at various levels, that is as a program of activities. The firm 
can use activity A1 at level u1, activity A2 at level u2, and so on, where the parameter 
vector u = (u1, . . . ,u l ) denotes the intensity level at which each activity is run (on this 




























































































ASSUMPTION A.2: There exists a class {z*}/_, of vectors of capability parameters 
attached to each capital input type k (and, symmetrically, to each labour input type l) 
when combined with some complementary labour input type l (capital input k) for the 
performance of the productive task (k,l) = (l,k) in activity A1, such that
z* — W n • • • ’ ziLì • • • » zKn • • • i2K
where zkl G [0,1], zjk G [0,1] and the subscripts k G {1,...,A '} , l G {1 } index
two subsets of input factors that partition the set of input types in the economy.
This assumption forces the standard linear model above to capture the impact 
on production of organizationally determined values that are taken by capability pa­
rameters. For a given positive quantity x G X(y) of input factors, let aki(z‘) be the 
contribution to output obtained in the i'-th activity from some fraction £*/ of some 
capital input Xk as combined with some fraction xik of some labour input £/.
ASSUMPTION A.3: There is complementarity in production, that is
aki(zl) = aik( z‘)
> o if 4, z]k > o,
= o if 4 , z]k = o,
for all A' 6 {A'}/=n f or nonnegative quantities xk\ < xk, x,k < X|, and for all 
zkhzlk € [0, 1]-
From Definition 2, we know that the parameters zkl and z\k can be interpre­
ted as proxies for the organizational capabilities of the firm in the operation of tasks 
(k,l) = (l,k) in the z-th activity by pairs of complementary inputs types. The expres­
sion of a*/(z‘) emphasizes the complementarity in production as resulting from some 
organizational capabilities and not from some intrinsic attributes that define the type 
of input resources. The simplest possible linear model of production that is parame­
trically defined in z can now be written as
A (y,z) = {x(z) : x(z) > ua, u G Ĥ _}, ( i )
for all y € R+ such that u/3 > y, or equivalently as
K(x,z) = {y(z) : u/3 > y(z), u € R[}, (2)
for all x € R+ such that x > ua. Here a  and 0 are the /  x M-dimensional input 
matrix and the I  x TV-dimensional output matrix, respectively, that describe the M 




























































































the competence matrix in which each column is the competence vector z' as defined 
above. A coefficient cv^of a denotes the quantity of the m-th input used by the i-th 
activity at unit intensity and a coefficient 0 'n of 0  denotes the n-th output quantity of 
the i-th activity at unit intensity.
This linear model is compatible with the neo-classical axiomatic framework. It 
inherits all properties from the parent output and input correspondences as defined 
in the previous section. Concentrating now for expositional purposes on the simplest 
possible situation in which a single output is produced, observe (i) that there exists a 
production function F(x) = sup{j/ € R \  : y & F (x ,z)} ,x  € R+, and (ii) that F(x) is 
homogeneous of degree 1 in x, and (Hi) that F(x) is homogeneous of degree 1 in z. The 
latter two properties of homogeneity in input quantities and in capability parameters 
are related to the nature of technological and organizational knowledge as described in 
Definitions 1 and 2, respectively.2 Their significance can be made clear by considering 
two attributes of any economic good that are commonly identified in the theory of 
externalities, namely rivalry and excludability. These attributes can be represented 
by two axes that define four categories as follows. By definition, a private good is 
both rivalrous and excludable while a public good is both nonrival and nonexcludable. 
Goods that are rivalrous and nonexcludable can be referred to as weak private goods. 
They are defined as rivalrous goods that may be excludable in principle but at some 
prohibitively high cost. Goods that are nonrivalrous and excludable can be named 
weak public goods. A common example for this category is the patented process of 
production or design of a product that can be replicated at virtually no cost.3
Both technological knowledge and organizational knowledge can be located in this 
typology. First, (embodied) technological knowledge — as characterised by Definition 
1 — is a set of related inputs and outputs that belong to the category of private 
goods. Rivalry and excludability apply because the definition of production sets above 
implicitly states that the physical facilities that describe some capital type and the 
human skills that describe some labour type are inherently tied to a physical object 
(some piece of machinery or some human body). The economic consequence is a 
replication argument. For a given competence matrix z, if all capital and labour inputs 
are changed by the same proportion, then the level of output is changed by the same 
proportion also. Second, (disembodied) organizational knowledge — as characterized
2The proof of those claims are standard and can be obtained from the author upon request.




























































































by Definition 2 — can be interpreted as a set of weak public goods, that is as a set 
of (possibly completely) excludable and also nonrivalrous factors of production. The 
excludability assumption is meant to guarantee the possibility that firms may differ in 
their organizational capabilities. The nonrivalry attribute is assumed to hold because 
disembodied knowledge is not tied to any physical object by Definition 2. The economic 
interpretation is straightforward. If the capital and labour inputs x together with all 
the capability parameters as represented in the competence matrix z are increased by 
the same proportion, then the output is more than proportionally increased. More 
formally from the properties of homogeneity given in (in) and (iv) above one obtains
T(Ax,Az) > AK(x,z)
where A > 0 must be such that \ z kl < 1 and Az\k < 1 for all parameters zlkl and z\k 
in z for the inequality to make economic sense. In Penrosian terms, this says that the 
”productive opportunity” (1959, p. 31) — represented here by y (x ,z )— of some given 
resources x available to the firm is conditioned by some organizational knowledge z that 
refers to the ability to extract some potential services embodied in capital and labour 
assets when combined together in productive tasks. For some given organizational 
knowledge, the exact replication of input factors does not imply any change in the 
organization of production and therefore results in constant returns to scale. For some 
given amount of input factors, a proportional increase in organizational capabilities as 
represented by the capability parameters leads to the same replication argument and 
accordingly to constant returns to scale also. With an increase in the physical medium 
supporting technological knowledge and in the disembodied organizational knowledge 
that describes the firm capabilities in organizing this medium in production, output 
increases more than proportionally.
When the size of the firm is measured by the quantity of output that is obtained 
from the transformation of some given input resources involved in production, the 
inverse relationship between the input and output correspondences says that the study 
of the growth of the firm is equivalent to the examination of T(x,z).
4 Im p lica tion s for th e  G row th o f th e  F irm
The objective of this section is to derive some propositions from the linear model that 




























































































” [S]o long as expansion can provide a way of using the services of its resources more 
profitably than they are being used, a firm has an incentive to expand; or alternatively, 
so long as any resources are not used fully in current operations, there is an incentive 
for a firm to find a way of using them more fully." (p.67).
The question of comparative statics that is examined hereafter is what happens when 
a change occurs in input factors, on the one hand, and in economic competence, on the 
other hand. In order to be consistent with the terms used in the preceding sections, the 
two phenomena are referred to as technological change and as organizational change, 
respectively. The analysis concentrates on the transformation of inputs into a single 
output by one single activity studied in isolation. Accordingly, superscripts that refer 
to this particular activity can are omitted hereafter for clarity, as would be the case 
in a single productive process situation. For a given quantity x of available resources, 
the organizational problem is now to select one assignment — out of all possible as­
signments respecting the proportions specified by the activity — that maximises the 
sum of contributions on(z) = a;*(z) to production. Recall that complementarity in 
the production of y 6 R}+ imposes not only that Xi<(y, z) /  0 and X/Jy.z)  /  0 but 
also that Xx(y,  z) U X l(t/,z) =  X(y,z).  Accordingly, the problem in the allocation of 
input factors boils down to matching the two sets Xx(y,  z) and Xc(y, z), by combining 
fractions Xki of some capital input x* with some fraction xy, of some labour input x/. 
The outcome ati(z) = a^(z) of any pair (xn,x/fc) involved in the performance of the 
task (k, l) = (l, k) is set out in the K  x /.-dimensional performance matrix a(z). The 
assignment problem can be recasted into linear programming (LP) terminology to give
K  L
F (x ,z )=  m a x T r i n i f z ) ,  (3)
such that
E L i xik < XI, 1 = 1 , ----L,
Etel x k l < X k, k =  l , . . . , K ,
X k i , * i k  >  o.
Technological change: The following proposition relates to the first part of the
Penrosian quotation above, which says that so long as expansion can provide a way of 
using the services of its resources more profitably than they are being used, a firm has an 
incentive to expand. The term expansion is interpreted as an increase in output that is 




























































































Under scrutiny is the direction of productivity gains (and a fortiori profitability gains, 
other things being equal) that result from an expansion in available input resources x, 
for some unchanged capability vector z.
PROPOSITION 1: Under assumptions Al — A3, F(.,z) has 
(i ) decreasing differences in x on X k and on X f ,  that is
F(x + x' + x", z) — F(x + x', z) < F(x + x", z) — F(x, z). (4)
if either (x ',x") € X K x X K or (x',x") 6 X i  x X L, and 
(il) increasing differences in x on X k x X i , that is
F{x  + x' + x", z) -  F(x + x', z) > F(x + x", z) -  F (x , z). (5)
r/ either (x',x") 6 Xk x X i  or (x',x") e X j x  AV- 
Proof: in Appendix.
This proposition says that the maximum output F{., z) resulting from the optimal 
assignment of complementary factors x € li,f +L involved in the activity under scrutiny 
displays (i) decreasing differences in these inputs when the additional factors x' and 
x" that are introduced in production both belong to the subset of capital inputs or to 
the subset of labour inputs, and (ii) increasing differences when they do not belong 
to the same subset of inputs. The former case can be interpreted as a particular 
instance of the law of diminishing marginal productivity that is not rooted in the 
unavailability of some particular resources but in the fact that they do not belong 
to complementary sets of input factors. In the latter case, everything happens as if 
the changing available amount of complementary input factors were exploited in an 
increasingly efficient way by an unchanged set of organizational capabilities. This 
means that the integration of additional complementary resources provides a way of 
using the services of productive resources more profitably, other things being equal. In 
any case, technological change captures an extention of the boundaries that describe 
the physical possibilities of transforming resources. These possibilities are rooted in 
the embodied attributes of capital and labour inputs. Changes within these boundaries 
are of the organizational kind.
O rganizational change: The following proposition relates to the second part of the




























































































in current operations, there is an incentive for a firm to find a way of using them more 
fully. In the present analysis, the way of using resources more fully is interpreted as an 
increased ability to exploit a given set of resources, that is as a rise in the capability 
parameters attached to the inputs involved in production. In this case, changes occur 
in z only. Accordingly, the analysis concentrates on the characterisation of changes 
in the scale of production as a result of changes in the amount z of organizational 
capabilities, for some unchanged amount of inputs x operated in fixed proportions. To 
save notational clutter, denote by Zk = {z : zik = 0} the set of competence vectors 
for which all capability parameters attached to type-/ input are zero. And denote by 
Zl — {z : Zkl = 0} the set of competence vectors for which all capability parameters 
attached to some type-/: input are zero, all k 6 {1, . . . ,  I i } and all / € {1, . . . ,  L).
PROPOSITION 2: Under assumptions (A1 — A3), F (x ,.) has
(i) decreasing differences in z, that is
F(x, z + z' + z") — F(x, z + z') < F(x, z + z") — F(x, z), (6)
if either (z',z") 6 Zk x  Zk or (z',z") € Zl x Zl; and
( ii) increasing differences in z, that is
F(x, z + z' + z") — F(x, z + z') > F(x, z + z") — F(x, z), (7)
if either (z',z") € Zk x  Zl or (z',z") 6  Zl x  Zk -
Proof: in Appendix.
This proposition asserts that the direction of changes in productivity gains is 
dependent upon whether or not changes in economic competence simultaneously affect 
the use of complementary inputs. Changes in productivity gains are negative (posi­
tive) when improvements in organizational capabilities concern the use of substitutable 
(complementary) working factors. There are increasing returns to economic compe­
tence when some innovation results in a more efficient use of at least two available and 
effectively working resources that belong to complementary sets of inputs. It follows 
that improvements in the ability to use more fully some unchanged complementary re­
sources in production lead to increasing gains in profitability, other things being equal. 
The main result of the analysis is simply that these changes in productivity gains do 
not relate to (dis)economies of scale or scope. They stem from complementarities in 




























































































5 A N u m erica l E xam ple
The objective of this section is to apply the definitions and propositions offered in the 
previous sections by examining two cases of a numerical example that illustrate the 
propositions on organizational change. Consider a single-process production system 
that involves only two pairs of complementary factors. This is represented by
4
^ = y i
m = l
where x = ( i j ,  x2, x3, x4) = (1, 1, 1, 1), a  = ( a i ,a 2, a 3, a 4) =  (1, 2, 1,2), with i j ,  x2 € 
X k and x3,x 4 € X l - Formally, the organizational problem consists in finding
F (x ,z) =  maxIWiI„ £*  E i akl(x), 
such that
T.l=\Xik < xt, 1 = 3,4,
Ht=3xkl < k = 1,2,
X k h X i k  > 0 ,
where
. . , , 1 =  ZktoikXk + zikQiXi if Zu Zik > 0,
aki(z )  =  alk(z )  <
( =  0 if zki zik =  0.
Different values taken by the capability parameters attached to each input factor give 
different productive instances. From the proof of propositions 1 and 2 in the appendix, 
we know that the continuous LP problem above is strictly equivalent to a discrete 
LP problem. This means that the organizational problem boils down to a choice 
between two possible sets of productive tasks (k, l), all k, all /, that describe alternative 
assignment types — say, Type A and Type B — of input factors, where
Type A = {(1,3),(2,4)},
Type B  = {(1,4),(2,3)}.
In assignment Type A, capital input 1 and labour input 3 are assigned to each other 
while capital input 2 and labour input 4 are assigned to each other. The choice in 
assignment types (i.e., two collections of disjoint pairs of complementary inputs) does 
not imply any change in the input ratios which are technologically determined for 
the productive activity by the vector a. Shifts in assignment types (from A to B or 
from B  to A) as a result of changes in capability parameters are recombinations of the 
same input factors in the same proportions into different productive tasks that give the 




























































































differences and increasing differences, respectively, in the maximum amount of output 
F (x ,z) obtained from the transformation of some unchanged quantities of capital and 
labour inputs.
Case 1: decreasing differences The capability parameters of the firm are displayed 
in Tables 1(a).
X k (v) 3 4 X l(v ) 1 2
1 0.1 0.1 3 0.1 0.1
2 0 .8 0.5 4 0.5 0 .6
Table 1(a): capability param eters attached to each input type k £ {1,2} when com­
bined with some input type / € {3,4}, and to each input type / € {3,4} when combined 
with some input type k £ {1,2}, in the productive tasks (/, k) = (k, /). For example, the 
value taken by the capability parameter attached to capital input 1 when combined with 
labour input 3 is z 13=  0.1, and the value taken by the capability parameter attached 
to labour input 4 when combined with capital input 2 is 242 =  0.6. Incremental changes 
occur in 214 and 231 (in bold characters)
Consider positive changes in the values taken by parameters Z\ 4 and in 231, other things 
remaining equal. The optimal choice of assignment type for given values taken by the 
capability parameters results in output levels that are displayed in Table 1(6). The 
production function F(x, z) is characterized by decreasing differences in z, as expected.
*31 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 .0
0.1 1 .4 0 b 1 .4 0 b 1 .4 0 b 1 .4 0 b 1.40 1 .4 5 m 1 .5 0 m 1 .5 5 m 1 6 0 m 1 6 5 m
0.2 1 .4 5 b 1 .4 5 b 1 .4 5 b 1 4 5 b 1 .4 5 b 1 . 4 5 1 .5 0 m 1 .5 5 m 1 6 0 m 1 .6 5 m
0.3 1 .5 0 b 1 .5 0 b 1 .5 0 b 1 .5 0 b 1 .5 0 b 1 . 5 0 b 1 . 5 0 1 . 5 5 m 1 6 0 m 1 6 5 m
0.4 1 .5 5 b 1 .5 5 b 1 .5 5 b 1 .5 5 b 1 .5 5 b 1 .5 5 b 1.55s 1 . 5 5 1 .6 0 m 1 6 5 m
0.5 1 .6 0 b 1 .6 0 b 1 .6 0 b 1 6 0 b 1 .6 0 b l  60fl 1 .6 0 b 1.60a 1 . 6 0 1 .6 5 m
0.6 1 .6 5 b 1 6 5 b 1 .6 5 b 1 .6 5 b 1 .6 5 b 1 .6 5 b 1 .6 5 b 1 .6 5 b 1 .6 5 b 1 . 6 5
0.7 1 .7 0 b 1 .7 0 b 1 .7 0 b 1-70# 1 7 0 b 1 .7 0 b 1 .7 0 b 1 .7 0 b 1 .7 0 b 1 .7 0 b
0.8 1 7 5 b 1 .7 5 b 1 .7 5 b 1 .7 5 b 1 .7 5 b 1 .7 5 b 1 .7 5 b 1 .7 5 b 1 7 5 b 1 .7 5 b
0.9 1 .8 0 b 1.80a 1 .8 0 b 1 .8 0 b 1 .8 0 b 1 .8 0 b 1 .8 0 b 1 .8 0 b 1 80s 1 8 0 b
1.0 1 .8 5 b 1 .8 5 b 1 .8 5 b 1 .8 5 b 1 .8 5 b 1 .8 5 b 1 .8 5 b 1 .8 5 b 1 .8 5 b 1 .8 5 b
Table 1(6): F(x,z) displays decreasing differences in the capability vector z. 




























































































output quantities indifferently obtained with type A or type B assignments. For an 
example of decreasing differences, observe the change in output that results from a 
change in Z\4 from 0.3 to 0.5 together with a change in 231 from 0.6 to 0.8 (in bold 
characters). One finds 1.60 — 1.60 < 1.55 — 1.50.
In this example, increases in capability parameters reflect changes in the ability to 
perform productive tasks that cannot possibly appear together in the same assignment 
type. In particular, changes in zi4 express some increased ability in the performance 
of the task (1,4) in assignment Type B. Changes in 231 account for some increased 
ability in the performance of the task (1,3) that appear in assignment Type A only. 
Contributions to knowledge in the performance of the task (1,4) have no effect on 
productivity when the maximisation of output imposes the choice of assignment Type 
A in production. In other words, with Type A , since task (1,4) does not appear no 
type-1 capital factor is combined with type-4 labour factor (i.e., X\4 = 0). This in turn 
implies that increases in z \4 have no effect on the total product (i.e., Z\4X\4 = 0). By 
the same token, contributions to knowledge in the performance of the task (1,3) has 
no effect on productivity when assignment Type B is selected. That is, with Type B, 
£31 = 0 so that 231X31 = 0. In effect, everything happens in the model as if successive 
increases in capability parameters affected the same — and a fortiori substitutable — 
organizational capability (either Z \4 or 231), leading to decreasing differences for F(x,z) 
as predicted by Proposition 2(i).
Case 2: increasing differences The capability parameters of the firm are displayed 
in Table 2(a).
Xx(y) 3 4 X l(v ) 1 2
1 0.1 0.1 3 0.1 0.1
2 0.8 0.5 4 0.5 0.6
Table 2(a): capability parameters attached to each input type k £ {1,2} when com­
bined with some input type / £ {3,4}, and to each input type / £ {3,4} when combined 
with some input type k £ {1,2}, in the productive tasks (/, k) = (k, /). For example, the 
value taken by the capability parameter attached to capital input 1 when combined with 
labour input 4 is 214= 0.1, and the value taken by the capability parameter attached 
to labour input 4 when combined with capital input 2 is 242— 0.6. Incremental changes 




























































































Consider now positive changes in the values taken by the parameters 213 and 231, other 
things remaining equal. The optimal choice of assignment type lor given values taken 
by the capability parameters results in output levels that are displayed in Table 2(6). 
In this case the production function F(x,z) is characterized by increasing differences 
in z.
*3>
«13 0 .1 0 .2 0 .3 0 .4 0 .5 0 .6 0 .7 0 .8 0 .9 1 .0
0 .1 1 . 4 0 s 1 .4 0 b 1 .4 0 b 1 .4 0 a 1.40 1 4 5 m 1 .5 0 m 1 5 5 m 1 6 0 m 1 6 5 m
0 .2 1 .4 0 b 1 .4 0 b 1 4 0 b 1 . 4 0 1 4 5 m 1 .5 0 m 1 .5 5 m 1 6 0 m 1 .6 5 m 1 .7 0 m
0 .3 1 .4 0 b 1 .4 0 b 1.40 1 .4 5 m 1 .5 0 m 1 .5 5 m 1 .6 0 m 1 .6 5 m 1 7 0 m 1 7 5 m
0 .4 1 .4 0 b 1 . 4 0 1 . 4 5 m 1 .5 0 m 1  5 5 m 1 6 0 m 1 6 5 m 1 .7 0 m 1 .7 5 m 1 .8 0 m
0 .5 I.4 0 1 4 5 m 1 5 0 m 1 5 5 m 1 .6 0 m 1 .6 5 m 1 7 0 m 1 7 5 m 1 .8 0 m 1 8 5 m
0 .6 1 4 5 m 1 5 0 m 1 .5 5 m 1 .6 0 m 1 6 5 m 1 7 0 m 1 7 5 m 1 8 0 m 1 .8 5 m 1 9 0 m
0 .7 1 5 0 m 1 .5 5 m 1 6 0 m 1 .6 5 m 1 .7 0 m 1 .7 5 m 1 .8 0 m 1 .8 5 m 1 .9 0 m 1 .9 5 m
0 .8 1 5 5 m 1 .6 0 m 1 .6 5 m 1 .7 0 m 1 .7 5  4 1 .8 0 m 1 .8 5 m 1 9 0 m 1 9 5 m 2 . 0 0 m
0 .9 1 6 0 m 1 .6 5 m 1 .7 0 m 1 7 5 m 1 .8 0 m 1 .8 5 m 1 9 0 m 1 .9 5 m 2 . 0 0 m 2 .0 5 m
1 .0 1 .6 5 m 1 .7 0 m 1 7 5 m 1 .8 0 m 1 8 5 m 1 .9 0 m 1 .9 5 m 2 . 0 0 m 2 .0 5 m 2 .1 0 m
Table 2(6): F(x,z) displays increasing differences in the capability vector z. 
Subscripts A or B  refer to the assignment type. Numbers in italic give the maximum 
output quantities indifferently obtained with type A or type B  assignments. For an 
example of increasing differences, observe the change in output that results from a change 
in Z13 from 0.2 to 0.4 together with a change in 231 from 0.3 to 0.5 (in bold characters).
One finds 1.55 -  1.45 > 1.45 -  1.40.
By contrast with the previous example, increases in capability parameters now reflect 
changes in the ability to perform productive tasks that can only appear altogether in 
the same assignment type. This is made very clear by the fact that changes in 213 
and 231 express some increased ability in the performance of the same task (1,3) in 
assignment Type A. However, observe that simultaneous changes in, say, 213 and 242 
or in 224 and 231 would lead also to increasing differences in the maximum output level, 
as predicted by Proposition 2(H).
In the two cases of the numerical example above, efficiency in production implies 
that more productive assignment types — that is, organizational choices — tend to 
replace less productive ones through cumulative improvements in capabilities. Impedi­
ments of all kinds that prevent a shift in assignment types would make improvements in 
organizational capabilities ineffective. Observe that these shifts are discrete and make 
obsolete those organizational capabilities that were working in some abandoned assi­




























































































as specified by some fixed input ratios, the direction of shifts in assignment types (from 
A to B or from B  to A) depend on the initial distribution of capabilities and on the 
directions of their improvements. In all cases, optimal changes in assignment types 
require some investments in capabilities before their becoming effective in production. 
Observe that a more complex example including more than two tasks in production 
would be associated some assignment types with overlapping tasks. In that case shifts 
in assignment types can result both from investments in ’’working” capabilities (i.e., 
capabilities attached to tasks that are effectively performed in production) and from 
investments in ’’maturing” capabilities (i.e., capabilities that may become effective in 
some other assignment type).
The interpretation of this example at the industry level is straightforward. To see 
this, assume that the costs incurred in improving capabilities are nonzero and increasing 
in the elements of z. Consider the situation in which organizational knowledge is fully 
excludable. Then decreasing (increasing) differences for f ’(x, z) in z are equivalent to 
diminishing (increasing) returns to scale in knowledge investments. Other things (i.e. 
market size in particular) being equal, in a competitive output market the directions 
of investments in capabilities would operate as a selection mechanism. This means 
that firms represented in case 2 would grow at the expense of firms represented in 
case 1. The market share of firms represented in case 2 would increasingly grow with 
positive changes in organizational capabilities at the expense of the market share of 
firms represented in case 1. This would come out as a consequence of differences in the 
directions of investments in capabilities only.
6 F in a l R em arks
The numerical example illustrates two interesting features of the model that empha­
sise the role of internal organization as a source of productivity gains in the operation 
of unchanged quantities of inputs combined in fixed proportions. First, the state of 
organizational capabilities command the choice of organization type in production. As 
an empirical implication, this means that two firms that happen to be identical in all 
aspects but in their endowments of capabilities (same inputs, same proportions, same 
types of outputs) may find it profitable to adopt different types of organization in pro­
duction. Second, the discrete character of changes in the organization of production 




























































































in the adopted assignment type. Symmetrically it makes some cumulative investments 
in capabilities effective that had no impact on productivity with another organization 
format. In other words that are common in the literature specializing on innovations, 
positive changes in organizational capabilities are competence destroying (some capa­
bilities become useless) or competence enhancing (some capabilities become effective) 
after a change in the organization of production. The empirical implication is that a 
firm that invests in training or research and development with a view to improve pro­
ductive efficiency will not benefit from these efforts unless it can reassign unchanged 
input factors on the shop-floor.
No attempt was made to model the observed actions by business organizations 
that may contribute to enhance organizational knowledge. Arguably, the definitions 
and propositions above can be used as building blocks for the examination of these 
practices in further research.
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7 A p p en d ix
First, observe that the specific form that was chosen for a*/(z) in order to introduce 
complementarity in the linear model, namely
ak,(z) = a,k(z) •
= 2/ciCtfcI/c + ZlkQlXl if
= 0 if
z i k  >  0 , 
z« Zlk = o,
is a natural consequence of the homogeneity of degree 1 of F(x, z) in x together with 
Euler’s theorem, since
Zki^k-
dT. m = l + ZlkXl dZ: = ZktockXk + ztkOgxi,<-v I cn
O X k  O X i
for all k £ { 1 ,... ,  A'}, all / G { ! , . . . ,  L}. Second, observe that the maximum value of 
the objective function in the LP problem in (3) is attained with all xki = 0 or x ki =  xk 
and with all x\k = 0 or x;t = x/ (the proof is available in Dantzig (1963), p. 318). 
This means that the fractions xki and x/t disappear from the solution. The following 
(continuous) linear programming problem
K L




























































































for some given productive activity, is therefore equivalent to the (discrete) assignment 
problem that consists in solving
5
where S = inf(A', L). The maximum is taken over all possible assignments or collections 
of disjoint pairs {(ka,la) , . . .  ,(k§, Is)}, all k 6 { 1 ,..., A'}, all l 6 { 1 ,... ,  L}. Then one 
can now adapt the proofs of two theorems by Shapley (1962) to the present problem.
7.1 P roposition  1
Under scrutiny is the impact on F(x, z) of a change in the quantity of input factors x.
Proof of Proposition 1 (i) (decreasing differences in x) WLG consider the case 
(x',x") e X K x X K with x' = (0 ,...,0 ,x 't ,,0 ,...0 ) , and x" = (0 ,... ,0,x't',„0 ,. . .  0), 
where k1, k" € { 1 ,..., A'} and x ',_,. x'!.,, > 0. That is, the input factors x to be assigned 
optimally by pairs in production are augmented by x' and x". The proof proceeds by 
induction on the number A(K, L) = inf(A', L — 1).
Case 1: A(A', L) = inf(A', L — 1) = I\ = 0 is ruled out by assumption .4.3 (complemen­
tarity).
Case 2: \ (K ,L )  = \nf(K,L  — 1) = A — 1 = 0 => A = 1 and I\ > 1. Because this 
case was seen as "easy, though not wholly triviar (p. 46) in the proof of the corre­
sponding Theorem 1 by Shapley (1962), the discussion was omitted. It can proceed 
as follows. In that case the K  x A-dimensional performance matrix a(z) collapses to 
a A’-dimensional vector a(z) =  (an (z),a2i(z)> • • •, «A'i(z)) with K  > 1. The problem 
consists of assigning a single worker type, say, type-1 worker in quantity x\, to one of
the K  machine types available in quantities X/tgp...a} that yields the highest possible
level of output. Because the parameters that describe the competence vector remain 
constant, for clarity z is ommited in the notation of this paragraph. One obtains
F(x) = sup{afcl)*=1,
F (x  + x') = sup{F(x),atu},
F(x + x") = supjF fxJ.afu},




























































































where { 1 ,..., A'}. Two subcases arise. First, F(x + x' + x") = F(x) =t> F (x  +
x'+x") =  F (x+ x ') = F(x+x"). Therefore F(x+x'+x")-F(x+x')  = F (x + x ")-F (x ), 
and Proposition 1(f) holds. Second, F(x  + x' + x") > F(x) leads to other 4 subcases:
(!) either ak't > F(x) and < F(x), then F(x  + x') =  F(x  + x' + x") =  a*-i 
and F(x + x") = F(x) = akl. Therefore F(x + x' + x") — F(x  + x') = F(x + x") — F(x), 
and Proposition 1(f) holds;
(if) or ak’\ > F(x) and ak"i > F(x), then F(x + x') = a*u and F(x  -f x' + x") = 
sup{at-i,a*«i}. If sup{at>i,ay<1} = ak'\ then F(x  + x' + x") — F(x  + x') = 0 and 
F(x + x") — F(x) > 0. If sup{a*.i,ak»1} = a*"i then F(x  + x' + x") -  F(x  + x") = 0 
and F(x + x') -  F(x) > 0. Therefore F(x + x' + x") -  F(x  + x') < F(x + x") -  F(x), 
and Proposition 1(f) holds;
(iff) or > F(x) and a*u < F(x): symmetric to subcase (f);
(iv) or ak"\ > F(x) and a^\ > F(x): symmetric to subcase (if).
Case 3: \ (K ,L )  = inf(K ,L  — 1) = L — 1 > 0 => L > 2 and K  > 1. Now the 
two capital inputs x' and x" can be simultaneously introduced in production. Three 
subcases arise. The first two axe trivial, the third one is of more interest. First, only x'k, 
appears in the output maximizing assignment. One finds F (x+ x '+ x") = F (x+ x ') and 
F(x + x") =  F(x),  and Proposition 1(f) holds. Second, only x"v, appears in the output 
maximizing assignment. One finds F(x  + x' + x") = F(x + x") and F(x  + x') = F(x) 
and Proposition 1(f) holds. Third, both x'k, and xk„ appear in the output maximizing 
assignment. In this subcase the following is more or less immediate from Shapley 
(1962). The induction hypothesis says that Proposition 1(f) holds at rank \ (K ,L ) ,  
that is for
j  X(K,L) = L - l ,  j  \ (K,L)  = K,
[ \ ( K , L ) < K ,  { X(I\,L) < L - l ,
when input factors are augmented by capital inputs only (i.e., the ’’capital” version). 
Suppose now that Proposition 1(f) is false for the ’’capital” version for all (x', x") G 
X k x X k , i.e. that
F(x +  x' + x") -  F(x + x') > F(x + x") -  F(x), (8)
and look for a contradiction. Let / ', /" €  { 1 ,..., L) be the indices of the labour inputs 
xr and xi" paired with x'k, and x"k„, respectively, in the output maximizing assignment 




























































































X L x X l are such that Xf> = (0, . . . , 0, xi',0, . . .  0), and Xi" = (0, . . .  ,0, ip ,  0, . . .  0). 
Now F (x  +  x' +  x") =  F(x — Xf — x(..) + a*-/' + at"/" together with (8) implies that
F(x -  xi' -  X f)  + ak'i' + ak"i" -  F(x + x') > F(x + x") -  F(x). (9)
Moreover
! F(x  + x') = F(x -  x,,) + ak,,.
[ F (x + x") = F (x  -  Xi") + at«i" 
together with (9) implies that
F(x -  x,' -  X,") +  ak'i' + ak",« -  [F(x -  x,-) + ak'r] > [F(x -  x,") + ak"i»] -  F(x).
Eventually, one obtains F(x) -  F (x -  x(..) > F (x  — X/.) -  F (x  — x/- — x/-), which says 
that Proposition l(i) does not hold for the ’’labour” version (when input factors are 
augmented by labour inputs only) at rank X(L — 2, K ). Now observe that A(L — 2, K) = 
min(F — 2, K  — 1) = min(F -  1 — 1, K — 1) = min(A' — 1, L — 1 — 1) = A (K, L) — 1. 
This implies in turn that Proposition 1(1) does not hold for the ’’capital” version at 
rank A(K,L)  — 1, contradicting the induction hypothesis. Therefore Proposition l(i) 
holds for the ’’capital” version at rank A (K, L) + 1, as required.□
P roo f of P roposition  l(n ) (increasing differences in x) The adaptation of 
the proof of the Theorem 2 by Shapley (1962, p. 47) for the proof of Proposition l(ü) 
strictly follows the adaptation above of the proof of the Theorem 1 by Shapley (1962, p. 
46) for the proof of Proposition 1(f) above. Considering the crise (x',x") 6 X k x .V , 
the proof now proceeds by induction on the number A(/i, L) = inf( A', L). In order 
to avoid redundancy it is omitted here and can be obtained from the author upon 
request. □
7.2 P rop osition  2
One can now build on Proposition 1 in order to consider the impact on F(x, z) of a 
change in capability parameters in z.
P roo f of P roposition  2(i) (decreasing differences in z) WLG, let (z',z") 6 
Zk x Zk with z' =  (0, . . .  , 0, zk'i',0, . ■ .0), and z" =  (0, . . .  , 0, zk»i",0, . . .  0), where 
k \  k" € {1, . . . ,  A'}, l" € { 1 ,..., L] and z rr  > 0, zk"i" > 0 are such that zk'i' + zk'i' < 




























































































Zkt +  Z k’i' + Z k " i"  <  1 for the change in the capability parameters to make economic 
sense. Four cases arise. Case 1: — 0 and Z k"i"  —  0. Z k 'i 'X k i =  Z k 'i 'X k i  —  0 =>
F (x , z + z' + z") = F (x ,z  + z') =  F (x , z +  z") =  F (x ,z ) , and Proposition 2(f) 
holds. Case 2: z*u> =  0 and z*»/" > 0. Z k 'i 'X k i  =  0  => F (x ,z  +  z') =  F (x ,z )  and 
F (x ,z  +  z' +  z") =  F (x ,z  + z"), and Proposition 2(i) holds. Case 3: z^j- > 0 and 
z w i "  =  0. z k " i" X k i  =  0 => F(x, z + z") =  F (x , z) and F (x , z +  z' +  z") =  F (x , z +  z'), 
and Proposition 2(t) holds. Case 4: z*>(< > 0 and Z k"i"  >  0. Considering changes in the 
performance of tasks (k ' , l ' )  and (k " ,  l " )  that are induced by a change in organizational 
knowledge by the addition of z' and/or z" to z, one obtains a*-|/(z +  z') =  Z k 'i 'Q k 'X k ' +  
Z k 'i'O ik 'X k ' +  z i'k 'O ti 'X i'-  This implies that F (x ,z  +  z') =  F(x  +  x', z), where
I  x' =  (0,.. .,0,z*.|'Zt<,0,. . .  ,0) e X K if Zfc't' = 0,
I x ' = ( 0 , . . . , 0 , ^ i l . ,0 , . . . ,0 )  € X K if zw > 0.
Symmetrically, a*«/"(z +  z") =  Z k " i" Q k " X k "  +  Z k " i" O k " X k "  +  z i» k " C ti" X i>< implies that 
F(x, z  +  z") =  F(x  + x", z), where
j  x" = (0,. . .  ,0, Zk"i"Xt" ,0 , . . . ,0)  e X K if zk"i" =  0,
( x" = (o....... o , ^ - z l. . ,o, . . . ,o) exK if zk"i" > o.
Eventually, F(x, z +  z' + z") — F(x , z + z') =  F(x + x ' + x", z) — F (x  +  x ', z), and 
F (x ,z  + z") — F (x ,z )  =  F (x  +  x", z) —F(x , z), where (x', x") 6 X k x X k - Accordingly, 
Proposition l( t)  applies to yield F (x , z + z' + z") — F(x, z +  z') <  F (x ,z  +  z") —F (x ,z ) , 
as required. □
P ro o f  o f P ro p o s itio n  2(ii) (increasing  differences in  z) WLG consider the case 
(z', z") £  Z k  x Z l  with z' =  ( 0 , . . . ,  0, Z k 'i’ , 0 , . . .  0), and z" =  (0 ,. . .  ,0, z / " k " ,  0 , . . .  0), 
where k',k" 6 { 1 ,...,A '} , € { 1 , . . . ,  L} and > 0, z i" k "  > 0 are such that
Z k 'i' +  Z k 'i1 <  1 and z/c";" +  Z("fc" <  1, for the change in the capability parameters to make 
economic sense. Then the proof proceeds as in the preceding paragraph (for decreasing 
differences) and one finds F (x , z + z '+z") —F (x , z+z') = F (x + x '+ x " , z) —F (x  + x ',z ) , 
and F (x ,z  + z") — F (x ,z )  =  F (x  + x",z) -  F (x ,z ) , where
x '  =  ( 0 , . ■ • , 0 ,  Z k ' r X k ’, 0 , . . - , 0 ) €  X k if Zt .(. =  0,
x '  =  ( 0 , . • ■ , 0 ,  ^ f - X k - , 0 , . .
z k 'l '
. , 0 ) e  A'k if >  o,
x "  =  ( 0 , . . • ,  0, z i " k " X i » , 0 , . . . , 0 ) 6  A'l  i f  z i» k ' ' =  o,
x "  =  ( 0 , . . . , 0 ,
zi"k"
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